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This article introduces an empirical strategy to the compensating differentials literature that i) allows
both individual observed and unobserved characteristics to be rewarded differently in firms based
on health insurance provision, and ii) selection to jobs that provide benefits to operate on both sides
of the labor market. Estimates of this model are used to directly test empirical assumptions that are
made with popular econometric strategies in the health economics literature. Our estimates reject the
assumptions underlying numerous cross sectional and longitudinal estimators. We find that the provision
of health insurance has influenced wage inequality. Finally, our results suggest there have been substantial
changes in how displaced workers sort to firms that offer health insurance benefits over the past two
decades. We discuss the implications of our findings for the compensating differentials literature.
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Without a national health insurance system most Americans receive health beneﬁts from
their employers. As recent years have been characterized by rapid inﬂa t i o ni nh e a l t hc a r e
costs and health insurance premiums,1 there are increasing reports that employers have
either reduced or even stopped oﬀering coverage, increasing the ranks of the uninsured.2
In aggregate, the percentage of workers with employment-based health insurance has
dropped from 70.0% in 1987 to 59.8% in 2004.
Economists generally argue that proﬁt maximizing employers would respond to the
costs associated with the provision of health insurance by reducing wages, thus maintain-
ing the total reward paid to the employees. Whether employers truly adjust wages for
the provision of health insurance is a long-standing question in health economics. Evi-
dence of a wage / fringe beneﬁtt r a d e o ﬀ has been diﬃcult to establish empirically, in part
because jobs that oﬀer health insurance may diﬀer substantially from those where this
beneﬁti sn o tp r o v i d e d . 3 Empirical researchers have traditionally attempted to answer
this question using wage regressions. Researchers arrive at conclusions by examining the
sign and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient on the health insurance receipt variable.
Studies generally diﬀer in the source of variation used to identify health insurance receipt
in these regressions. The early literature on this topic typically did not explicitly contain
a discussion of the source of variation in the health insurance variable and researchers
implicitly assume that employees have implicitly made these choices when accepting a job
oﬀer. Using cross-sectional data researchers typically recover wrong signed estimates of
the compensating wage diﬀerential particularly if they ignore the inherent endogeneity of
health insurance receipt. Longitudinal data that explicitly account for individual speciﬁc
permanent unobserved heterogeneity have also been used, yet results from these studies
also do not support the theoretical prediction of a signiﬁcant negative compensating dif-
ferential.4 To identify the tradeoﬀ, many of these studies must overcome the endogeneity
o fj o bs w i t c h i n g .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i fj o bl o c ki sa ni m p o r t a n tf a c t o ri nt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,t h e n
3the sample used in the analysis for identiﬁcation will disproportionately contain those in-
dividuals who do not feel locked into their job, possibly attributable to a lower valuation
of health insurance. To overcome this empirical challenge, Simon (2001) uses panel data
on displaced workers who switch jobs for exogenous reasons, but also fails to ﬁnd evidence
of compensating wage diﬀerentials, which she attributes to diﬃculty in empirically dealing
with the heterogeneity of job-skill matching.
In contrast, a recent literature attempts to use a credible source of variation in the
costs of health insurance, which is arguably exogenous to workers employment decisions, to
identify whether these additional costs are borne by workers. These studies generally ﬁnd
evidence consistent with the theory. For example, Gruber (1994), exploiting changes in
state legislation that made coverage for childbirth a mandatory part of all health insurance
policies, ﬁnds that the wages of workers expected to beneﬁtf r o mt h i sp o l i c yw e r es h i f t e d
down by 59-90%. Sheiner (1999) uses variation in health care costs across cities and ﬁnds
that older workers in cities with higher health costs earn lower wages. While these studies
are unable to disentangle whether the shifting of health insurance costs is on the group at
the workplace or on the individual, Pauly and Herring (1999) ﬁnd a ﬂatter wage-tenure
proﬁle among job-insured workers presenting evidence consistent with an individual wage
adjustment for health insurance.
In his review of the compensating diﬀerentials literature, Pauly (2001) sustains the ex-
isting studies do not provide compelling evidence, either in favor, or against the existence
of this trade-oﬀ. The interest in achieving a more solid answer to whether this trade-oﬀ
truly exists is unquestionable, given the numerous implications for public policy. To shed
light on this issue as well as provide an explanation for the diversity of the ﬁndings in this
literature, we introduce a new panel data estimator to the health economics literature
and reexamine the experience of displaced workers who change jobs for arguably exoge-
nous reasons over a eighteen year period. The estimation strategy originally developed in
Lemieux (1998) allows observed and unobserved characteristics to be rewarded diﬀerently
4in ﬁrms that provide and do not provide health insurance, and it generates estimates
robust to both employer and employee selection on unobservables. Estimates from our
model are used to ﬁrst, evaluate the existence and robustness of any potential wage and
health insurance trade-oﬀ and second, to decompose the wage gap between ﬁrms that oﬀer
and do not oﬀer health insurance. Our approach additionally allows us to test implicit
assumptions underlying conventional empirical approaches used in the health economics
literature.
Examining the wage decomposition provides an opportunity to understand how dis-
placed workers sort into new positions in the labor market. The equalizing diﬀerences lit-
erature that underlies the wage health insurance trade-oﬀ implicitly assumes that workers
should sort into jobs with diﬀerent attributes based on their preferences for those at-
tributes.5 In contrast, comparative advantage would suggest that workers sort into ﬁrms
or sectors in which they would perform relatively better than other potential employees in
the labor market. Understanding the sorting process potentially could yield insights into
how the labor market functions and how inequality develops.6 For example, if the under-
lying distribution of skills among displaced workers were stable over time, any changes in
the manner in which these workers sort to new jobs would lead to a potentially diﬀerent
allocation of these skills across ﬁrms over time.7
While it is well known that displaced workers experience large and persistent earnings
loss,8 this group is becoming a topic of increased policy relevance. Since many Americans
are a pink slip away from losing their health insurance coverage,9 numerous policies have
been introduced in the last ﬁve years to promote the continuation of health insurance
coverage for displaced workers. For example, the Health Coverage Tax Credit introduced
federally in 2002 covers 65 percent of the premium amount paid by eligible displaced
individuals for health insurance coverage, where eligibility is primarily based on prior
industry. By reducing the costs of health insurance while unemployed, these polices
may alter the search behavior for newly displaced workers by increasing the take-up
5of unemployment beneﬁts and the length of unemployment spells. In addition, several
individual states have introduced health plans for displaced workers and new policies are
being continually debated at both the federal and state level. To provide some guidance
for policymakers regarding the impacts of such programs, we use our data and estimates
from the wage decomposition to ascertain whether there have been any changes in how
displaced workers search for and sort into a new job following displacement (based on the
provision of employer provided health insurance) over the last two decades.
Our analysis yields three major ﬁndings for the health economic literature on the
impacts of employer based health insurance provision.
1) We ﬁnd that the diversity of results in the health economics literature on the
existence of a compensating wage diﬀerential may be more a consequence of imposing
too stringent assumptions on the empirical model rather than a failure of the underlying
theory. Our empirical estimates reject assumptions that underlie single index control func-
tion, OLS, matching, ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst diﬀerence strategies. Speciﬁcally, we clearly
reject the assumptions that permanent individual speciﬁc unobserved (to the analyst)
heterogeneity is constant and that selection of jobs by displaced workers can be explained
by variables observed to the analyst. Further, since selection of this new job is based in
part on factors unobserved to the analyst, our results suggest that this does not operate
exclusively on the workers’ side of the labor market but also aﬀects hiring decisions by
ﬁrms. Researchers in this area must account for both employee and employer decisions
regarding employer provision of health insurance.
2) Our empirical results indicate substantial changes have occurred over the past two
decades both in how displaced workers sort across ﬁrms when seeking reemployment
and how ﬁrms select workers for employment. We observe that, if on one hand, the
importance of selection bias in explaining the unadjusted wage gap has diminished by
over 40%, on the other hand, the portion of this bias due only to unobserved (to the
analyst) characteristics, such as ability or innate health status has more than doubled.
6Finally, we ﬁnd that recently displaced workers are searching nearly three weeks longer
for jobs that provide health beneﬁts, suggesting that those who need health insurance
shop for it.
3) We ﬁnd that the provision of health insurance has substantially inﬂuenced wage
inequality. Similar to the large established literature that has explored the determinants
of wage structure in the U.S. labor market,10 we estimate that, in the past decade, ﬁrms
that provide health insurance are oﬀering increasingly larger returns to observed individual
characteristics. In particular, we ﬁnd that there is nearly a 30% increase in the returns
to a college education in ﬁrms that provide health beneﬁts. Residual wage dispersion
h a sa l s oi n c r e a s e do v e rt h ep a s tt w od e c a d e sa so u rr e s u l t si n d i c a t et h a tt h er e t u r nt o
unobservable skills, such as motivation, innate health status or cognitive ability has risen.
W h i l ew ed on o tﬁnd any evidence of a health insurance compensating wage diﬀerential,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of health insurance on wage of workers in ﬁrms providing health
insurance has increased by 50% between decades. In addition, we present evidence that the
role of unobserved characteristics is increasingly aﬀecting the dispersion of wages between
sectors. Our results suggest that a larger fraction of the displaced work force is seeking jobs
with health insurance beneﬁts and, faced with a more heterogeneous pool of applicants,
employers in the health insurance sector are increasingly rewarding observed skills. We
hypothesize that the inability to identify the impact of health insurance on wage levels
is likely a consequence of omitting ﬁrm characteristics that arise from aggregate worker
sorting rather than the heterogeneity of individual job-skill matching.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
economic model and empirical method that we employ to estimate the parameters of the
model. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis. Estimates of our model and
other empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4. A concluding section
discusses what our ﬁndings on worker sorting imply for the compensating diﬀerentials
literature and suggests avenues for further research.
72E c o n o m i c M o d e l
We consider a two sector model of the economy with diﬀerences in the provision of health
insurance. The expected log wage of worker i at time t in the sector that does not oﬀer










where xit is a vector of observed (to the market and the econometrician) characteristics.










where αH = αN + HI
0
itβ
HI, and HIit is an indicator variable that equals one when the
individual is employed in the sector of ﬁrms that oﬀers health insurance. We explicitly
permit the returns to observed and unobserved characteristics to vary across sectors. The

















i are the return of the individual time invariant unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) characteristics in the respective sectors.11 We do not impose any restrictions on
the joint distribution of (θ
N
i , xit) or (θ
H
i , xit), allowing for arbitrary correlations. This for-
mulation allows for both absolute advantage and comparative advantage since individual
heterogeneity can respectively aﬀect both the intercept and slope of the wage function.12
As in the program evaluation literature, an individual’s actual wage can be expressed
as a function of two potential wages via the following equation
lnWit = HIit lnw
H
it +( 1− HIit)lnw
N
it + νit (4)
8where vit is an idiosyncratic error term that captures diﬀerences between the observed
wage and the wage expected on the basis of skills and sector choice. Substituting equations





















where ξit = ηit + vit. Lemieux (1998) demonstrates that the wage diﬀerential between




























HI is the direct compensating wage diﬀerential. The ﬁr s tt e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t so f
equation (6) reﬂects the mechanism by which workers pay for receiving health insurance,
while the second term in square brackets reﬂects average skill diﬀerences between the
workers that select jobs that oﬀer health insurance and the workers that prefer jobs
without health insurance as part of the compensation package. Similarly, the variance of














































T h ec o m p o n e n t si ns q u a r eb r a c k e t sr e s p e c t i v e l yr e ﬂect, the impact of health insurance on
the dispersion of wages in that sector, the diﬀerential heterogeneity in workers between
sectors, and the diﬀerence in residual variance.
Unlike control function or selection correction estimation strategies, this model permits
selection of workers to a job to be on both sides of the market. Employers in the health
insurance sector may prefer to select individuals who have higher values of θ
H
i , which
could represent among other factors ability, motivation and health status. This creates a
wedge in the labor market as individuals with low values of θ
H
i m a ys e e kj o b sw i t hh e a l t h
insurance provision, but employers prefer healthier individuals and / or individuals with
higher ability who can respectively help reduce the cost of providing health insurance and
/ or potentially increase output.13
92.1 Empirical Method
To estimate the structural parameters in equation (5), Lemieux (1998) proposes the fol-



















N)+( Ψ − 1)θi]+ξit (8)
where Ψ is a coeﬃcient vector that captures diﬀerentials rewards to unobserved skills
across sectors. Similarly, the wage equation in period t−1 can be rearranged as a function
of θi, yielding
θi =















Direct substitution of equation (9) into equation (8), quasi diﬀerences and removes θi

















N)]. Direct non linear least squares
estimation of equation (10) will yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of
Ψ, which stems from the correlation of the lagged dependent variable (Wit−1)w i t ht h e
transformed residual (ξit +
1+HIit(Ψ−1)
1+HIit−1(Ψ−1)ξit−1).15
Consistent estimates of equation (10) can be obtained by GMM provided one has
access to an instrumental variable for Wit−1. While instruments could be chosen using
t h es t r i c te x o g e n e i t yi d e n t i ﬁcation assumption for estimation of traditional panel data
equations, we use annual state level information on the previous job’s union coverage rate
at the industry level. We hypothesize that industries with higher union coverage rates
should be associated with higher wages in the jobs prior to displacement. At the ﬁrm
level, Buchmueller et al. (2002) suggest that reduction in union density accounts for 20-
35% of the reduction in health insurance coverage. Further, it is unlikely that these state
10level aggregate measures are related to the individual speciﬁct i m ev a r y i n gu n o b s e r v a b l e s
in equation (10).16
To identify the structural parameters, the unobserved time invariant individual speciﬁc









as a constraint on the optimization of equation (10), and ensure θit satisﬁes equation (9).
With estimates of the structural parameters, the wage gap (as expressed in equation (6))
can be decomposed into the true eﬀect of health insurance on wages and diﬀerences in
the characteristics of workers between sectors.17
3D a t a
The data used in this study comes from the Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) of
the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a comprehensive, cross-sectional sur-
vey of approximately 50,000 households in the United States. The DWS is a biennial
supplement to the CPS presenting a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of
displaced workers (those who have lost jobs because of plant closings, business failures,
and layoﬀs) and includes retrospective data several years prior to the administration of
the survey. Among these workers, their job loss resulted from exogenous decisions that
were unrelated to both their particular performance and preferences over the structure of
the compensation package.18 Most important for this study, the DWS contains informa-
tion on wage rates and health insurance status, both on their job prior to and following
displacement.19 The DWS also includes detailed information on demographic character-
istics and individual labor market variables pre and post displacement for a large sample
of displaced workers.
We use data from DWS supplements collected from 1984 to 2002 and largely follow the
11sampling criteria used in Simon (2001), deleting observations where workers were either
employed part-time, self-employed or held seasonal jobs.20 Relative to the nationally
representative CPS, displaced workers are disproportionately male, previously employed
in semi-skilled blue collar labor and are less likely to be a college graduate (particularly
in the 1980s). The data was supplemented with information from both the January and
March CPS to obtain additional controls in our analysis. For instance, tenure information
comes from the January Basic dataset, and is calculated as the number of years the
individual have been employed in the current job.
Despite the many advantages of using the DWS data for estimating wage/health in-
surance trade-oﬀs, there are a number of limitations that should be noted. First, the
DWS treats health insurance as a homogeneous good and there are many dimensions
across which plans vary such as annual deductible, and co-payments. We cannot accu-
rately measure the cost of health insurance or the part paid by the employee.21 Second,
the data set lacks information on other fringe beneﬁts such as employer provided pen-
sion plans, employer provided retirement health insurance that are likely correlated with
health insurance beneﬁts. Third, data on pre-displacement ﬁrm characteristics such as
ﬁrm size and proﬁtability are not collected. As we will discuss, this limitation is likely
the most severe. Fourth, the data lacks information on skill transferability. Fifth, the
survey only asks whether a person has private health insurance coverage but does not
ask the source that provides these beneﬁts which could lead to biases, particularly for
individuals that have spouses with family health beneﬁts. To mitigate these biases we use
the March CPS supplement as it contains more detailed information on whether employer
insurance is in their own name allowing us to verify whether this insurance is really from
their own primary employer. Unfortunately, due to the rotational structure of the CPS
we lose approximately 43% of our sample when we match respondents.22
An additional potential concern with the DWS is whether the responses subjects made
are valid or subject to recall error, since it relies heavily on retroactive questions. Oyer
12(2004) conducts a fascinating examination of the presence of recall error in the DWS
and ﬁnds that, while displaced workers report the reason for job loss quite accurately,
respondents may overstate only their pre-layoﬀ wages. Overall, he concludes that DWS
recall error is not dramatic and that it has little, if any, relationship with other variables
in the survey. In our analysis, we use an instrumental variables procedure to correct for
the endogeneity of pre-displacement wages, which should further reduce concerns of biases
attributable to measurement error.
Another important feature of the DWS worth noting is that there was a change in
the recall period for which information on job loss was collected. Until 1994 workers were
asked if they had lost a job in the last ﬁve years, while, after 1994, the time frame was
limited to three years only. This change, together with a shift in the political and health
sector environment, will permit us to use the samples pre and post 1994 separately in our
analysis.23
Table 1 presents summary statistics for portions of the sample used in this study. In
the top panel, the full sample is divided into four groups, based on their health insurance
provision pre and post displacement. The majority of the sample (64%) corresponds to
workers that received health insurance on both jobs and are called "Always". Workers
gaining health insurance following displacement constitute 14% of the sample, similarly
12% of the sample lost health insurance beneﬁts with displacement and the remaining
10% did not receive health insurance at either job.
There are substantial diﬀerences between these groups in terms of their level of ed-
ucation, earnings, race and probability of switching industry and occupation following
displacement. The two groups of the sample that did not receive health insurance prior
to displacement have, on average, a lower level of education, a lower pre-displacement wage
a n da r em o r el i k e l yt ob eA f r i c a nA m e r i c a nt h a ng r o u p sw h i c hr e c e i v e dh e a l t hi n s u r a n c e
in both periods. Further, losing health insurance following displacement is associated with
both large wage losses and a higher likelihood of switching industry or occupation. Notice
13that jobs pre and post displacement that oﬀer health insurance provide higher wages.24
The usual explanation for this ﬁnding is that those employed in good jobs are likely to
diﬀer from those in worse jobs on both observable and unobservable characteristics.25
In the second part of Table 1, we examine how the characteristics of the sample
diﬀer between 1984-92 and 1994 onwards. Notice that, after 1994, the displaced workers
are more educated, slightly older and contain more females. Further, displaced workers
after 1994 are less likely to have children or receive unemployment beneﬁts following
displacement. While age and education would suggest an increase in the propensity
to receive health beneﬁts, not having children could serve to reduce the beneﬁts from
receiving health coverage from an employer. Interestingly, more workers in our sample over
the last decade received health insurance following displacement, which is the opposite of
the pattern in the general labor market.
4R e s u l t s
GMM estimates of equation (10) are displayed in Table 2. The full sample is presented
in column one, while columns two and three respectively present the subsamples for the
periods 1984-92 and 1994-2002. Health insurance is not signiﬁcantly related to workers
wage in any of the samples. Only in the most recent decade is the sign of the coeﬃcient
estimate consistent with the compensating wage diﬀerential theory. While this result
does not diﬀer from most estimates found in the compensating diﬀerential literature, our
empirical strategy allows us to test some implicit assumptions within that literature.
The assumption that unobserved heterogeneity has a constant impact across sectors
underlies ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁrst diﬀerence and diﬀerence in diﬀerence propensity score match-
ing estimators. Our model treats the returns to this unobserved term in a more ﬂexible
manner and parameter estimates of Ψ are presented in the second row of Table 2. For the
full pooled sample (presented in column one), Ψ is statistically diﬀerent from one at the





14implying that unobserved skills are rewarded diﬀerently in the two sectors of the economy.
However, the constraint that Ψ is statistically diﬀerent from one cannot be rejected at
the 1% conﬁdence level for the 1984-1992 sample in the second column. The presence of
this omitted selection eﬀect may be biasing the impacts reported in several longitudinal
studies. This suggests that, conditional on characteristics, some workers may have a com-
parative advantage in the health insurance sector, which, based on the diﬀerences in the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient between columns two and three, appears to be of increasing
importance in recent years.
Further, consistent with earlier studies on the incidence of health insurance costs
on worker wages, there are substantial diﬀerences in how characteristics are rewarded
across the two sectors.26 There are lower returns to pre-displacement tenure and being
African American in ﬁrms that provide health insurance beneﬁts. On the other hand,
being married, being older and being more educated yield higher returns in ﬁrms that
oﬀer these beneﬁts. While the positive return to marriage decreased slightly between
the sample periods, there was an approximate 27% increase in the returns to a college
education relative to 12 years of education or less in ﬁrms that provide beneﬁts. In total,
the gap in the health insurance sector between college degree holders and individuals who
have fewer than 12 years of education rose over 30%, from 0.538 to 0.716. The wage gap
between males and females became smaller in both sectors following 1994. It is interesting
to note that while older workers received signiﬁcant wage decreases in the sector that
does not provide health insurance prior to 1994, the relationship becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant for the period between 1994 and 2002. Finally, while the diﬀerential to being
African American increased after 1994, there is no additional wage oﬀset in the health
insurance sector.
The estimates from Table 2 are used to decompose the unadjusted health insurance
wage gap into a true eﬀect of health insurance on wages and a selection bias component
following equation (6). The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the decomposition for the
15entire sample period. Health insurance has substantial impacts on workers in the health
insurance sector that primarily operate through diﬀerential returns to observed charac-
teristics. For the full sample, over 80% of the eﬀect of health insurance on workers in the
health insurance sector operates through this channel. Further, the role of unobserved
factors is limited.
The change in the components of the wage decomposition between 1984-1992 and 1994-
2002 in columns two and three of Table 3 presents several interesting ﬁndings. Between
these periods, the unadjusted wage gap has grown, which is, in part, (and consistent with
Farber and Levy (2000)) due to ﬁrms which stopped oﬀering beneﬁts over this time period
tended to be clustered in low-paying industries. The prime component that explains the
growth in the unadjusted wage gap between sectors is the substantial increase in the
returns to observed skills. The returns to these skills have more than doubled between
periods. Examining the second and third columns of Table 2, it is clear that these rewards
are being driven by the increased returns to a college education as well as returns to age,
which may proxy for total labor market experience.
Not only did the returns to observed skills rise across periods, but there was also a large
decrease in the amount of the gap that is attributable to selection bias. Overall selection
bias dropped by nearly 30%, from 0.179 to 0.127 driven by the diﬀerences in observed skills
across sectors. Information on the portion of selection bias attributable to observables and
unobservables is presented in rows six and seven of Table 3, respectively. Selection bias
due to unobservables measures the similarity in average unobserved attributes between
workers in the two sectors (i.e. θH and θN). The ﬁfth row of Table 4 indicates that the gap
in these attributes has become smaller between the two sub-sample periods. On average,
workers employed in ﬁrms that oﬀer health insurance have larger values associated with




than those employed in ﬁrms that do




. Yet, the portion of selection bias due to unobserved skills
that cannot be accounted for by estimators such as OLS and matching rose by nearly 15%
16between decades. Since θH > θN, and the health insurance wage gap is slightly higher for
individuals with higher unobserved skills, we would predict that the OLS estimates of the
compensating wage diﬀerential would be biased upwards.27
Our estimates are also used to decompose the unadjusted gap in variance of wages
between sectors. The results are presented in Table 4. The unadjusted gap appears small
and indicates that health insurance reduces the dispersion of wages between sectors.28
While the overall size of the diﬀerence between the variance of wages between sectors
becomes smaller after 1994, the role of the two major components of the decomposition,
the eﬀect of health insurance on health insurance workers and selection bias, increases
markedly. In particular, the portion of selection bias due to diﬀerences in unobserved
skills and the direct eﬀect of both observed and unobserved skills on the variance of
wages increase by over 50% between the periods. While workers appeared on average
to be increasingly more homogeneous across sectors in Table 3, the results in the ﬁfth
row suggest that there is substantially more heterogeneity in the unobserved skills of
individuals working in the health insurance sector (relative to the other sector) after
1994.
In Table 3, we found that employers in the health insurance sector did not pay workers
diﬀerently on the basis of these unobserved skills and increasingly rewarded observed skills.
If employers assume that observed productivity skills are highly positively correlated with
unobserved skills it may be the case that this heterogeneity has led employers to increase
the reward to observed characteristics. While this should suggest that the variance in
the wages between the sectors would increase across the two sample periods, there is,
as reported in the second row of Table 4, a large oﬀset since unobserved skills have
signiﬁcantly reduced the variance of wages for health insurance workers in the health
insurance sector.
The ﬁndings in Table 4 are also consistent with selection operating on both sides
of the labor market, which rules out traditional selection correction or control function
17estimators. The negative covariance in the sixth row indicates that observed and unob-
served skills are positively correlated in the sector that does not provide health insurance,
but negatively correlated in the health insurance sector. This is consistent with positive
selection among workers with low unobserved skills in the health insurance sector and
negative selection among workers with high observed skills. This selection becomes more
important over time as the size of the covariance terms increases by over 50% between
the sample periods. This positive selection may be a result of increased worker shopping
for positions that oﬀer health insurance beneﬁts and may have partially contributed to
the recent health insurance cost spiral for employers.
In our estimation, we used the average unionization rate in the industry the worker
was employed in pre-displacement to instrument for previous period wage. To assess
the suitability of our instrument we consider a simple OLS regression of the ﬁrst stage
regression and run an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the instrument. The results
are presented in Table 5 for the case with information on unionization coverage rates.
We ignore the speciﬁcations with interaction terms included in the instrument set since
overidentiﬁcation tests occasionally reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid.29
Coeﬃcients on the instrument and exogenous regressors in both columns are reasonable
in sign and magnitude. The instruments are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of pre-
displacement wages and the F-statistics on its signiﬁcance is respectively above current
cutoﬀs (i.e. Staiger and Stock (1997)) for weak instruments for both the full sample and
pre-1994 sample.
Since the reliability of our estimates depends directly on the validity of our instrument,
t h el o wF - s t a t i s t i co v e rp o s t1 9 9 4p e r i o di sac o n c e r n ,s i n c ei tm a yi n d i c a t ew e a ki d e n t i ﬁ-
cation. Weak identiﬁcation could result in i) the GMM estimates being inconsistent and
biased towards the NLLS estimates,30 and ii) the test statistics for inference are inaccu-
rate. Regarding the ﬁrst problem, not only is the coeﬃcient on the instrument reported in
Table 5 signiﬁcant at the 1% level but also a Hausman test rejects the consistency of the
18NLLS estimates. Further, we attempted to correct the statistical inference problem using
Moreira (2003) conditional approach to construct tests of coeﬃcients based on the con-
ditional distributions of nonpivotal statistics. If the instruments have low strength then
the conﬁdence intervals should increase relative to those based on standard asymptotic
theory. We ﬁnd that the length of the 95% conﬁdence interval increased by only 16.8%,
a small margin which increases our conﬁdence in the validity of the instrument. Taken
together, these diagnostics suggest that it is unlikely that the second period estimates are
due to a poor instrument.
An additional concern is that the average unionization rate in the industry the worker
was employed in pre-displacement may not be a suitable instrument, since it is related to
an individual’s own union status, which is implicitly contained in the residual. To examine
the robustness of our results, we replicated the full analysis accounting for individual union
s t a t u sb o t hp r ea n dp o s td i s p l a c e m e n tf o rt h ep o r t i o no ft h es a m p l et h a tp r o v i d e dt h i s
information and our results did not change neither qualitatively, nor quantitatively.31
4.1 Worker Sorting and Health Insurance
4.1.1 Are Search Patterns in the DWS Consistent with Increased Worker
Sorting?
Testing directly for worker sorting is diﬃcult without more detailed information on ﬁrms.
To present additional evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of an increase in
worker sorting we contrast job search patterns between post displacement health insur-
ance receipt conditional on pre displacement health insurance receipt over time. We
hypothesize that if worker shopping has increased then individuals who gain health in-
surance following displacement should have longer searches. Due to the sampling criteria
change after 1994, it is hard to compare these past histories between the two sampling
p e r i o d sa n dt h er e s u l t ss h o u l db eb i a s e da g a i n s to u rh y p o t h e s i s ,s i n c el o n g e rj o bs e a r c h e s
are possible in the earlier data collections.
19To draw comparisons we consider a diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy. First, we con-
trast the length of job search between new health insurance recipients with individuals
who never receive health insurance. Second, we compare individuals who receive health
insurance pre and post displacement to individuals who lose health insurance after dis-
placement. The implicit assumption underlying this strategy is common trend, that is
that any changes in outcomes between these groups must be the result of health insurance
status post displacement. Essentially we estimate a regression model of the form




itγ3 +( HIit ∗ t2)
0γ4 + t2 + vit (12)
where Yit is weeks of job search and t2 is a dummy for the period after 1994. If γ4 > 0,
this would support the hypothesis that individuals who receive health insurance following
displacement post 1994 are associated with an increase in job search. We estimate equa-
tion (12) separately for individuals who had health insurance prior to displacement and
for those who did not have these beneﬁts.
Column one of Table 6 presents diﬀerences in the experiences between jobs for in-
dividuals who lost health insurance following displacement versus those who had health
insurance in both jobs. Consistent with a story of increased job search, workers who found
employment in ﬁrms that oﬀered health insurance search for approximately three more
weeks. Since the average job search in this period is 10.586 weeks, this is an increase of
approximately 30% from the mean. However, the results presented in column two that
compare new health insurance recipients to individuals who never received health insur-
ance, do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in length of job search after 1994 for new
recipients. As shown in Table 1, on average, the workers who gain health insurance post
displacement have the shortest searches. Not surprisingly, older workers search longer in
both subsamples as do workers with more tenure on the earlier job and less education, as
they may have been most scarred from the displacement.
204.1.2 Is the link between unobserved productivity attributes and health in-
surance coverage homogenous?
Understanding if individuals with lower unobserved productivity attributes are increas-
ingly sorting to jobs that provide health insurance beneﬁts is clearly a question of policy
interest. While our data cannot directly address whether these individuals truly have lower
health status to determine if sorting may have contributed to the recent rise in health
insurance costs, we can examine whether the unobserved productivity characteristics of
workers are increasingly correlated with post-displacement jobs that provide beneﬁts. We
consider estimation of
b θi = γ1 + HI
0
itγ2 +( HIit ∗ t2)
0γ3 + t
0
2γ4 + vit (13)
where t2 is a dummy for the period after 1994 and b θi is the predicted individual time
invariant characteristics obtained from OLS estimation of the following equation
θit = δ1 + θit−1δ2 +  it (14)
where  it is a random unobservable, θit is calculated using equation (9) and GMM es-
timates from the ﬁrst column of Table 2.32 Table 7 present estimates of equation (13)
based on samples deﬁned by pre-displacement health insurance status and age.
For the full sample in column one, we notice that, while health insurance is associated
with higher unobserved attributes (γ2 > 0), the recipients in the second time period
actually have lower values of θi (γ4 < 0). This indicates that individuals who have health
insurance in the second period have on average values of θi that are 0.043 lower then
the earlier time period. This eﬀect is large and approximately equal to a 5% of the
standard deviation of θi. Columns four and seven present evidence that the magnitude
of this negative impact is not heterogeneous with respect to whether or not an individual
had health insurance pre-displacement. When we examine subsamples that are deﬁned
by age several interesting patterns emerge. The estimates of γ3 in the third, sixth and
21ninth columns demonstrate that there is a large decrease in θi associated with receiving
health insurance after 1994 for workers above 45. In contrast workers under the age of
45 either have γ3 estimates that are statistically insigniﬁcant (column eight) or of limited
economic signiﬁcance (columns two and ﬁve). The results in Table 7 suggest that while on
average unobserved productivity attributes are greater in the period following 1994, there
is a signiﬁcant negative association between these unobserved productivity attributes and
receiving employer provided health insurance after 1994. This eﬀe c ti sd r i v e nb yw o r k e r s
that are at least 45 years of age.33
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that, among individuals who have
health insurance in the period post 1994, they have i) lower values of θi, unobserved
productivity attributes that may include health status, and ii) the search for another
position that provides these beneﬁts lasted an additional two weeks. We hypothesize that
these individuals are most likely familiar with health insurance beneﬁts and increasingly
seek out jobs that oﬀer this amenity. As we discuss in the concluding section, such non-
random sorting is likely the primary reason why we cannot ﬁnd evidence of a compensating
diﬀerential in Table 4.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Surveys of workers consistently rank health insurance as far and away the most important
among all beneﬁts oﬀered in the workplace (Salisbury, 2001). Intuitively, health insurance
has the potential to inﬂuence numerous labor market decisions and many individuals may
be reluctant to consider working for companies that do not provide health beneﬁts.34 At
the same time, employers are increasingly facing large increases in the costs of providing
these beneﬁts. Hence, understanding how the provision of these beneﬁts aﬀects the labor
market has substantial policy and human resource implications.
In this paper, we extended the health economics literature on compensating diﬀeren-
tials by introducing an empirical approach that allows 1) both individual observed and
22unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics to be rewarded diﬀerently in diﬀerent
sectors of the economy, and 2) selection to operate on both sides of the labor market. An
important feature of this model is that the estimates enable us to test several assump-
tions that are made with existing empirical strategies. We ﬁnd that the assumption that
unobserved attributes are rewarded equally in both sectors which underlies ﬁxed eﬀects
and traditional diﬀerencing strategies is rejected. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence that there
is substantial selection on unobserved characteristics, which rules out matching and OLS
strategies. Finally, we ﬁn dt h a ts e l e c t i o no p e r a t e so nb o t hs i d e so ft h el a b o rm a r k e t ,a
feature that cannot be accounted for by traditional control function estimators.
W h i l ew ed on o tﬁnd any evidence of a health insurance compensating wage diﬀerential,
we observe that health insurance has increasingly inﬂuenced wage inequality. We present
evidence that the provision of health insurance is increasingly aﬀecting the dispersion of
wages across sectors, which is consistent with the ﬁndings in the compensating diﬀerentials
literature that have explored the incidence question from the perspective of employers.
Estimates from our model are also used to decompose the wage gap between the sectors
and we ﬁnd there are substantial changes in the selection of workers to ﬁrms that provide
health insurance beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we observe that there has been increasing sorting
based on comparative advantage. Finally, we ﬁnd that recently displaced workers are
searching nearly three weeks longer for jobs that provide health beneﬁts and that these
workers on average have lower unobserved productivity attributes.
An important limitation of this study is that the impacts we estimate are applicable to
displaced workers only. The composition of displaced workers not only diﬀers from other
workers in the labor market, but has also changed over time.35 Yet, it should be noted
that our ﬁnding of an increasing role of health insurance on wages is consistent with the
recent health economics literature that indicates that the recent rise in health insurance
premiums aﬀects a variety of labor market outcomes.36 Consequently, it is likely our
ﬁndings have some limited external validity.
23We do not view our failure to ﬁnd evidence of a compensating diﬀerential despite
using a more general estimation approach as a rejection of the underlying theory. The
simple compensating diﬀerentials theory remains inconsistent with two empirical features
of the U.S. labor market. First, there is large variability in costs of health insurance
across similar ﬁrms. Understanding the sources of this variability may suggest additional
variables that may need to be accounted for in wage regressions. In this study, we ﬁnd
strong evidence that the sorting of workers to jobs is consistent with comparative advan-
tage.37 While, sorting in the labor market is likely to lead to strong correlations between
observed and unobserved attributes of the individual with the corresponding variables of
their co-workers, our evidence also indicates that in recent years the distribution of these
unobserved attributes is more heterogeneous in the health insurance sector. Thus, sorting
to ﬁrms on the basis of preferences for health insurance is not perfect and there still may
remain heterogeneity at the ﬁrm level that is not a function of these individual speciﬁc
heterogeneities, suggesting that frictions exist in the labor market. Accounting for such
heterogeneity in addition to individual heterogeneity as well as the identiﬁcation of the
impacts of endogenous group formation at ﬁrms has typically been ignored (in part due
to data limitations) in the health insurance compensating diﬀerentials literature.38
Second, employers cannot set employee speciﬁc compensation packages. An increasing
body of evidence suggests that there is likely substantial heterogeneity regarding prefer-
ences for health insurance beneﬁts among workers within ﬁrms. For example, Gruber
a n dL e t t a u( 2 0 0 4 )ﬁnd that within ﬁrms, the median worker and workers in the highest
quantiles of salary exhibit a disproportionate amount of inﬂuence on decisions related to
health insurance coverage. These workers may also be willing to bear a disproportionate
amount of the costs through lower wages, and if these tastes can indeed be proxied by
observables such as salary, it may be useful to examine whether the tradeoﬀ exists by
examining those most likely aﬀected. For example, with longitudinal matched employee
a n de m p l o y e rd a t ai ti sp o s s i b l et oe x a m i n ew i t h i nﬁrms how the estimated trade-oﬀ varies
24across the salary distribution and how the distribution of residual wage dispersion varies
across ﬁrms that diﬀer in both beneﬁt provision and the cost of beneﬁts.39 In conclusion,
future research needs to consider general empirical models with richer data sources to
determine whether the compensating diﬀe r e n t i a lt r u l ye x i s t sa sw e l la ss h e dm o r el i g h t
on how health insurance provision aﬀects the labor market.
25Notes
1Between 2001 and 2004, premiums for family coverage shot up by 59 percent, com-
pared to a 9.7 percent gain in inﬂation and a 12.3 percent wage growth rate. See Kaiser
Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (2004) for details.
2The Kaiser Family Foundation (2005) reports that only 60% of companies oﬀered
health insurance to their employees in 2005, down from 69% in 2000. Gruber and McK-
night (2003) report that, in 1982, 44% of those who were covered by their employer-
provided health insurance had their costs fully ﬁnanced by their employer, but by 1998
this had fallen to 28%. Cutler (2002) ﬁnds that the increasing employee costs for health
insurance resulted in employees declining coverage in the 1990s. Increased anecdotal
evidence suggests that this trade-oﬀ exists, and there are reports in the popular press
that ﬁrms have even made termination decisions based strictly on an individual’s health
behavior, such as smoking, in an eﬀort to reduce health insurance costs (Armour (2005)).
3Bundorf (2002) shows that higher wage workers are more likely to receive health in-
surance beneﬁts. Gruber and Lettau (2004) ﬁnd that the decision to oﬀer health insurance
at the ﬁrm level depends on the prices faced by both the median worker and highly com-
pensated workers. Wiatrowski (1995) reports that medium and large establishments were
20% more likely to oﬀer health insurance to full time employees relative to small establish-
ments. Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000) show that spousal coverage aﬀects employment
decisions.
4Currie and Madrian (1999) present a survey of the early cross sectional and longitu-
dinal compensating diﬀerential studies in the health economics literature. They conclude
that many of these studies did not have the appropriate data to estimate the magnitude
of the compensating diﬀerential.
5Pauly (1986) suggests that the sorting of workers based on these tastes across sectors
is imperfect. Changes in the sorting process over time could partially explain the more
rapid increases in health insurance costs that may simultaneously aﬀect the levels and
26dispersion of salaries within ﬁrms that provide health insurance beneﬁts. We discuss the
implications of imperfect sorting for the compensating diﬀerentials literature in the ﬁnal
section.
6The implications of absolute and comparative advantage as sorting mechanisms are
outlined in Willis (1986) and Sattinger (1993).
7More generally, worker sorting could have profound impacts on the macroeconomy if
non market interactions exist, such as peer eﬀects (e. g. Benabou (1996) and Kremer
(1993)).
8See Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) for a careful analysis of earnings loss
following displacement and Farber (2003) for a survey of research on the experiences of
displaced workers.
9Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana estimated that 200,000 residents who had
health insurance through the workplace lost their beneﬁts due to Hurricane Katrina.
10See Katz and Autor (1999) for an extensive overview of recent changes in the U.S.
wage structure.
11An explicit characterization that would generate equations (1)-(4) in the context of
unions is provided in Robinson (1989). The model considered in this paper is based on
and discussed in further detail in Lemieux (1998). As noted by Lemieux (1998), the model
rules out individuals who change work voluntarily and focuses on involuntarily job loss.
12Most econometric approaches assume constant slope coeﬃcients which rules out com-
parative advantage.
13Cutler (1995) reports that there exists hug ev a r i a t i o ni nh e a l t hi n s u r a n c ep r e m i u m s
among otherwise identical ﬁrms that is partially the result of heterogeneity in the work-
force along health dimensions.
14Let θi = θ
N
i −ζ and θi =
θH
i−ζ
ϕ where ζ is an orthogonal error component as in Lemieux
(1998).
15Note that if one sets the Ψ =1 ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oaﬁrst diﬀerenced estimation
27procedure and imposes the assumption that unobserved attributes are rewarded in exactly
the same manner in both sectors. This assumption of constant rewards to unobserved
attributes also underlies ﬁxed eﬀects strategies. Note NLLS estimates of Ψ would be
biased even if the residuals are not serially correlated
16Note as we discuss in the subsequent section our results do not change if we include
individual’s own union status pre and post displacement in the estimating equation. The
state level aggregates are also likely to be correlated with any ﬁrm level residual.
17The estimates of β
HI,β
H,β
N and ψ are obtained from equation (10) and summary sta-
tistics provide information on xH = E[xit|HIit =1 ]and xN = E[xit|HIit =0 ] . Similarly,
θH = E[θi|HIit =1 ]and θN = E[θi|HIit =0 ]where θi is calculated using the pre-
dicted regressors via equation (9). The gap in the variance of wages can also be de-
composed using the same information, and considering that ΣXH = Va r[xit|HIit =
1], ΣXN = Va r[xit|HIit =0 ] ,σ 2
θH = Va r[θi|HIit =1 ] ,σ 2
θN = Va r[θi|HIit =0 ] ,
ΣXθH = Cov[xit,θ i|HIit =1 ] , ΣXθN = Cov[xit,θ i|HIit =0 ] ,σ 2
H = Va r[ it|HIit =1 ] ,
and σ2
N = Va r[ it|HIit =0 ] .
18Hammermesh (1987) presents evidence from early DWS surveys that these displace-
ments indeed come as a surprise to the worker and ﬁrm.
19The DWS does not contain hourly wage rates and we had to calculate this variable.
We assumed that health insurance is obtained from an individual’s primary position
and calculated the hourly wage rate for this position using information in the DWS.
Speciﬁcally, we took the diﬀerence between total wages and earnings from other jobs and
divided that by the average hours worked per week *weeks worked in a year.
20Simon (2001) used data from 1984 to 2000 in her analysis. The CPS 2004 data
diﬀer in their industry and occupation codes, which makes their addition to the analysis
impossible, since we use the average unionization rate in the industry as instrument.
Besides from the fact that we include an additional wave, the CPS 2002, our ﬁnal sample
diﬀers slightly from that in Simon (2001) as we apply a stricter deﬁnition of full time
28w o r ka tt h ep r e v i o u sj o b .N o t et h a tt h ed i ﬀerences in the sample do not aﬀect any of the
conclusions in Simon (2001).
21In all waves of the survey, the health insurance information about the old job refers to
health insurance from the worker’s own employer. From 1984 to 1992, the new job health
insurance variable asked for whether any group health insurance was held, and from 1994
onwards asked whether any private health insurance was held at the present time.
22Approximately 6% of matched individuals privately purchased insurance and nearly
31% received health insurance from a spouse. This subsample was removed from the
analysis. Note, our qualitative and quantitative results were robust if this subsample were
included in the estimation sample. This should reduce concerns regarding our implicit
assumption that for those individuals who could not be matched with the March CPS,
health insurance reported in the DWS was obtained from the primary employer.
23Health care reform was a major component of Bill Clinton’s campaign in 1992. This
year also saw a marked slowdown in medical spending and the end to a period of rapid
growth in enrollment in managed care plan. While 5% of the privately insured were in
managed care in 1980 it had risen to approximately 75% in 1992 and that percentage has
been fairly stable since 1992.
24More generally, there is substantial heterogeneity in unemployment spans and post
displacement job outcomes for displaced workers. Seitchik (1991) reports that while ap-
proximately 1
3 of all displaced workers were reemployed within 5 weeks, about 1
3 were not
reemployed until after more than 6 months. He also reports that 43% of workers displaced
between 1981 and 1986 had higher earnings on reemployed jobs in 1986 whereas over 30%
of workers were earning less than 3
4 of their former wages.
25The diﬀerence in the tax treatment of wage and non-wage compensation also means
that highly compensated workers will equally be those who most value non-wage compen-
sation.
26For example, Pauly and Herring (1999) report lower returns to experience in ﬁrms
29that provide health insurance beneﬁts, whereas Olson (2002) reports that being married
reduced wages for women working full time with health insurance.
27In fact, the OLS estimate of the impact of health insurance in a simple wage equation
does exceed the true eﬀect of health insurance on wages presented in Table 3. Note, the
OLS estimate may also suﬀer from bias if there are correlations between observed and
unobserved attributes.
28Recall this is the gap in the variance of log hourly wages. This gap is small relative
to the gap in average log hourly wages.
29As a robustness check we explored four alternative instrument sets. These sets were
chosen based on a suggestion in Lemieux (1998) to exploit the strict exogeneity condition
on the regressors of the model and use higher order terms and interaction terms of the
explanatory variables as instruments. While some of the instrument sets had slightly
better ﬁrst stage properties the general pattern of our results (available from the authors)
were robust to the diﬀerent instrument sets. Note, the selection of these instrument sets
relies on the plausibility of the strict exogeneity condition for identiﬁcation.
30The inconsistency of the GMM estimates depends on the relevance of the instrumental
variable. Hahn and Hausman (2003) show that the ﬁnite sample bias of these estimates
is inversely related to the ﬁrst stage F-statistic.
31Note that the inclusion of individual union status reduces eﬃciency as we use a smaller
sample and may also lead to additional concerns regarding endogeneity. Also note that
our underlying model has individuals choosing between sectors that diﬀer only in their
health insurance provision and not union status.
32Note that θis is measured with error since ξis is included on the right hand side
of equation (9). Since the model assumes that ηis in equation (3) is distributed iid
over time, this regression intuitively corresponds to regressing two variables with classical
measurement error on each other and obtaining the true signal by calculating the predicted
outcome (b θi).
3033We investigated the sensitivity of our results to the deﬁnition of t2. We found that for
workers above 45 the estimates of γ3 increase in absolute value as t2 indicates later time
periods (i.e. 1998 onwards).
34Madrian (1994) ﬁnds that among married men with pregnant wives, those without
h e a l t hi n s u r a n c ea r et w i c ea sl i k e l yt os w i t c hj o b s .
35Farber (2001) describes how the characteristics of displaced workers have changed
over time.
36For example, Cutler and Madrian (1998) and Baicker and Chandra (2006) ﬁnd impacts
on hours worked and employment rates whereas Gruber and Krueger (1991) using similar
identiﬁcation strategies with data from earlier time periods ﬁnd no impacts.
37There is, indeed, some evidence of worker sorting in the context of health insur-
ance within the health economics literature. Several studies (Marquis and Long (1995),
Monheit and Vistnes (1999) and Levy (1998)) show that workers with low preferences
for health insurance are disproportionately employed in ﬁrms that do not oﬀer coverage.
Similarly evidence of employees sorting to ﬁrms based on health insurance beneﬁts is
shown in Scott, Berger and Black (1989), Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000), and Levy
(1998). Yet, the evidence also indicates that sorting of workers to ﬁrms on the basis of
preferences for the compensation package is imperfect.
38Since the individual unobserved attributes of wokers that sort into a ﬁrm are likely to
be similar, a negative within group correlation between observed and unobserved charac-
teristics of individuals will arise, even if these variables are uncorrelated in the population.
Using a general model to estimate hedonic equations, Epple (1987) demonstrates that
simply using group ﬁxed eﬀects is unlikely to be suﬃcient to overcome potential biases.
39Alternatively one could examine the tradeoﬀ over the age or tenure distribution within
ﬁrms. For example, one could hypothesize that consistent with the ﬁndings in Pauly and
Herring (1999), workers with high tenure may have lower labor market mobility and be
more willing to accept increased shares of health insurance costs over time.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
By Health 
Insurance Status 
on Both Jobs  
Gainers of HI 
Post displacement job 
has Health Insurance 
Never Have 
Neither job has 
Health Insurance 
Always Have 
Both jobs provided 
Health Insurance 
  Losers of HI 
Pre displacement job 
has Health Insurance 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD    Mean SD 
Real weekly wage 
after displacement in 
US$  519.347  317.878 367.226 247.435 658.127 383.147 
 
415.652  262.314
Real weekly wage pre 
displacement in US$  526.384  345.894 417.867 278.890 733.458 419.259    579.383  326.019
Age  36.816  10.357  35.277  10.778  38.856  10.071    36.749  10.267 
Level of education 
below college  0.498  0.500  0.648  0.478  0.440  0.496    0.583  0.493 
Female  0.467  0.499  0.479  0.500  0.374  0.484    0.406  0.491 
Married  0.675  0.468  0.484  0.500  0.680  0.466    0.530  0.499 
Black  0.076  0.266  0.125  0.331  0.074  0.262    0.116  0.320 
Years of tenure pre 
displacement  3.669  4.231  3.262  3.856  6.857  6.851    5.459  5.642 
Same Industry  0.417  0.493  0.459  0.498  0.470  0.499    0.340  0.474 
Same Occupation  0.369  0.483  0.349  0.477  0.372  0.483    0.268  0.443 
Number of 
Observations  2228 1555 9395    1878 
By Time Period  1984-2002  1984-1992  1994-2002 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log of Pre Displacement 
Real Weekly Wage in US$  6.323 0.561 6.296 0.536 6.369 0.599 
Log of Post-Displacement 
Real Weekly Wage in US$  6.182 0.618 6.120 0.615 6.287 0.609 
Insurance in Old Job  0.749  0.433  0.766  0.423  0.721  0.449 
Insurance in New Job  0.772  0.419  0.762  0.426  0.790  0.407 
Female  0.403 0.491 0.386 0.487 0.433 0.496 
Married  0.641 0.480 0.659 0.474 0.609 0.488 
Black  0.085 0.278 0.087 0.283 0.080 0.271 
Age  between  35  and  44 0.304 0.460 0.296 0.456 0.318 0.466 
Age  between  45  and  54 0.192 0.394 0.165 0.372 0.236 0.425 
Age  over  55  0.078 0.268 0.079 0.270 0.076 0.266 
High  School  Education 0.384 0.486 0.423 0.494 0.317 0.466 
Some  College  Education  0.279 0.448 0.249 0.432 0.330 0.470 
College  0.233 0.423 0.202 0.401 0.286 0.452 
Children  0.666 0.472 0.790 0.407 0.455 0.498 
Collected Unemployment 
Benefits  while  Displaced  0.556 0.497 0.609 0.488 0.464 0.499 
Tenure on Job Pre-
Displacement  (in  years) 5.852 6.293 5.747 6.181 6.029 6.474 
Observations 14968  9429  5539 
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Table 2: GMM Estimates of the Wage Equation 
  1984-2002 1984-1992  1994-2002 






Point estimates of the differential returns to unobserved 






















































































































































































































Observations 14908  9387  5521 
Note: Regressions also include indicators on employer industry and region of residence and their interactions with 
health insurance. Standard errors in parentheses, 
a, 
b and 
c denote statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% confidence levels, respectively.  38
Table 3: Decomposition of the Unadjusted Weekly Wage Gap   
  1984-2002 1984-1992 1994-2002 
Effect of health insurance on workers in health 
insurance sector: 
         
   1. Compensating Wage Differential, 
HI β   0.046 0.054 -0.021 
   2. Effect of observed skills,  ( )
N H
H x β β −
'   0.203 0.156 0.318 
   3. Effect of unobserved skills, ( ) H θ ψ 1 −   0.008 0.000 0.015 
 Total  effect  0.257  0.210  0.312 
      
Selection bias:       
   4. Differences in observed skills, ( )
N
N H x x β
' ' −   0.112 0.132 0.089 
   5. Differences in unobserved skills, ( ) N H θ θ −   0.035 0.047 0.038 
 Total  bias  0.147 0.179 0.127 
    Unadjusted wage gap (WG)  0.404  0.389  0.439 
      
      
Note: The decomposition is based on equation (6) and we use the estimates presented in 
Table 2 to construct each component. 
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Table 4: Decomposition of the Unadjusted Variance of Weekly Wages Gap 
  1984-2002 1984-1992 1994-2002 
Effect of health insurance on workers in health 
insurance sector: 
         





H β β β β Σ − Σ
' '  
0.058 0.043  0.074 
   2. Effect of unobserved skills, ( )
2 2 1
H θ σ − ψ   -0.119 -0.047  -0.129 
   3. Covariance term,  ( ) H X
N H
θ β ψβ Σ − ' 2  0.004 0.005 0.006 
 Total  effect  -0.056 0.002  -0.049 
      
Selection bias:       




N β β Σ − Σ
'  
0.001 0.002  0.000 
   5. Differences in unobserved skills, 
2 2
N H θ θ σ σ −   0.065 0.000  0.064 
   6. Covariance term,  () N X H X
N
θ θ β Σ − Σ
' 2  -0.022 -0.015 -0.024 
 Total  bias  0.044 -0.014  0.039 
Difference in residual variance, 
2 2
N H σ σ −   -0.001 -0.002  0.000 
    Unadjusted variance gap (WG)  -0.013  -0.014  -0.009 
      
Note: The decomposition is based on equation (7) and we use the estimates presented in 
Table 2 to construct each component.  40
Table 5: First Stage Regressions of Pre Displacement Wage Assuming  1 = ψ  
Time Period  1984-2002 1984-1992 1994-2002 
































































































































































































Note: Regressions include information on gender, Hispanic, family composition, employer 
industry, unemployment insurance use, region of residence indicators and their interactions 




statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  41
Table 6: Linear Difference in Difference Estimates of the Impact of Health 































































































Note: Regressions include information on gender, Hispanic, family composition, 
employer industry, unemployment insurance use and region of residence indicators. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
a, 
b and 
c denote statistically different from 
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Nonparametric difference in difference estimates of the impact of health insurance receipt after 1994 on individual specific 
time invariant unobserved productivity attributes θi 
Sample 
 
Full Sample  Health Insurance Pre 
Displacement 
No Health Insurance Pre 
Displacement 
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Indicator variable for Period 




























Number  of  Observations 14968  10930  4038 11216  8064 3152 3752 2866 886 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.0063 0.0053 0.0140 0.0064 0.0053 0.0118 0.0117 0.0062 0.0454 
Note: Robust standard errors *10E-3 are in parentheses. 
a, 
b and 
c denote statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 